I have written about burglary before, but it is not a subject I cover a lot. I also have been reading a fair amount of “top tips” pieces recently, about who burglars are, how they commit their crimes, etc. Some of which are good, and some of which are woefully off the mark. Generally, I try not to provide tips and rules, as these can easily be gotten around, when criminals become aware of what the general public are being advised to do e.g. if the tip says to check a person’s ID, before you let them into your house, the criminal work-around would be to get a laminator and make a fake ID, etc. I think it is more productive to provide researched material that can educate, and help guide us in putting into place effective measures.  

It is important to understand how your house and neighborhood, may appear to a potential burglar. This will help you to establish a level of risk and understand your vulnerabilities – which in turn you will want to reduce/eliminate. A study by Cisneros (1995), found that the less “permeable” a neighborhood was, the less crime it experienced. A locale that is easy to navigate and drive through, is more likely to experience crime — including burglary — than one that is difficult and complicated to move through. There are several reasons for this, however the primary one is that areas that are less easy to access, are going to require more time for a burglar to familiarize themselves with e.g. they will need to have a good understanding of the road layout, in order to plan their exit strategy, and the more time they spend in a neighborhood, the greater the chance that their presence there will be questioned – criminals need to claim “legitimacy” in an area, so that they don’t stand out. The more restrictive the access to a property, such as a house at the end of a cul-de-sac, the less likely it is to be burgled i.e. there’s theoretically only one way in and one way out. Access control, also effects how a criminal can gain access to your property; how permeable is it? Do you have real and virtual barriers, surrounding your house? Is there a gate that somebody has to open in order to get onto the front path that leads to your door, or can they simply step off the side-walk/pavement and walk up to it? A good thorny bush planted under a window, can reduce access to what might otherwise be an easy point of entry. Burglars follow the path of least resistance, so the less permeable and accessible a property may seem, the less likely they are to select it.

One of the aspects of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) is “Territoriality”. Symbolic barriers such as fencing – low as well as high - around a property, create an idea of a “zone of control” i.e. this is not public space, it is protected space, etc. Armitage (2000), found that higher levels of territoriality, resulted in lower crime-rates, however, Hollis-Peel and Welsh (2014) found that when “fortressing” occurred, many of these benefits were negated, as high walls, the planting of hedges and shrubbery, that increased privacy, resulted in the reduction of the levels of natural surveillance; once a criminal was behind these barriers, they could act unseen and unobserved. Many burglars (Cromwell and Olson, 2004) have reported that they stayed away from neighborhoods, where the lawns were trimmed, the gardens maintained, and where it was obvious that the owners spent time looking after their property. Several reasons were given. One was the assumption that because they spent an effort looking after their home, it was likely that these houses had burglar alarms and good locks, another was that people in the neighborhood would be out working in their yards/gardens all the time, so it would be likely that they’d be observed as they engaged in their crimes. Whilst it may not be the case that this is the reality, it is the perception, and that is enough to deter many criminals.

There is little research done on the effects/impacts of good locks and bolts, etc., though a study by Wright and Decker (1994), showed that locks which slowed down a burglar were likely to have a deterrent effect, with the burglary being abandoned. However, for many burglars their point of access is through an open window or unlocked door – the best security features, if not used, are worthless. Most experienced burglars prefer to access a property from the back and will use small crowbars and screwdrivers to pry open windows and doors (Hearndon and McGill, 2004). In the U.S., a common entry point is through the basement door, which is not normally as sturdy as the other doors to the property; once inside, they are free to work at getting into the main property (there may even be easily visible tools in the basement to assist them) unobserved. Once inside, the main bedroom was usually the primary target, with other “adult” bedrooms being checked afterwards (Nee & Meaghan, 2006), before looking around downstairs. This order of operation occurs for several reasons. The contents of most downstairs rooms such as the living room can be assumed (there will be a TV, DVD/Blu-Ray Player, X-Box or Nintendo, etc. – many burglars will avoid old or electronic devices which go quickly out of date), whereas the contents of a main bedroom are not assumed, but may contain smaller, more valuable objects, which are easy to transport e.g. if you can steal a lot of easily transported jewelry, why bother with the TV on the way out? If you come up short in the bedroom, then there are always the electronic goods downstairs you can take on your way out. A practical measure to this is not to store your valuables in the main bedroom and/or fit a lock to secure it when you are out (also provides you with a safe-room). Another reason why experienced burglars work in this way, is that the longer the burglary goes on, the more likely they are to get caught (however this is not when/where most burglars are apprehended), and so it is better to be nearer to the exit routes, the longer the break-in goes on, rather than being caught upstairs, etc.

Most stolen goods are dispensed with extremely quickly (Ferrante & Clare, 2006) using known fences and certain pawn-brokers and second-hand shops. When I was a student, student houses which were easily identifiable by burglars – lots of young people, living together, who didn’t dress like the locals – were the main target for burglaries in the city e.g. if six people lived in a house it could be assumed that there were six stereos, possibly multiple television sets (this was the 90’s), etc. as opposed to a family residence where there would only be one of each. These burglaries were usually committed at night, when the occupants were out at bars, pubs and clubs, etc., as opposed to most residential burglaries that happen during the day, when people are out at work. If you were burgled, you would normally find your stolen goods the next day (afternoon), in one of a number of second-hand shops on a certain road. The goods were stolen, and turned into cash, in the shortest possible time.

Whilst many burglars spend time casing a neighborhood and selecting properties, often the actual moment of breaking-in is decided opportunistically e.g. a window is open, there is nobody on the street, etc., and most burglars report that if things aren’t going their way in the first two or three minutes, they’ll abandon it. There are things we can do to make our properties look less attractive to burglars, both psychologically and physically, and ways to target-harden our homes so that only the most determined burglar would spend the time trying to gain access to them, with most giving up and moving onto another property.